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At the very end of the last century, scientists produced the first draft of the whole human genetic sequence. 
But that was just the first step; the hard work of the first few decades of this century will be to learn more 
about how to apply genetic information to improve health. As the pace of technological development 
accelerates and we learn more about what genetic variations mean about individual human characteristics 
and health risks, so too does the risk and consequences of the misuse of such information become more 
significant. The principal answer to this challenge has been to safeguard privacy by constructing legal and 
technical barriers that conceal and anonymize genetic information. While it may be a worthwhile 
objective, ultimately privacy protections will likely fail in practice. If this is so, how can we prevent genetic 
information from being used to categorize, stigmatize, and subordinate? This Note approaches this 
problem by analyzing the African American experience with genetic discrimination in the United States. 
African Americans have confronted the adverse consequences of genetic research in ways that can serve as 
a foundation to understand future threats posed to racial minorities and everyone in society, as genetic 
testing increases in prevalence and the privacy of genetic information is unable to be protected. Studying 
the real history of genetic discrimination, rather than merely speculating about what may happen, can 
point toward policy solutions that go beyond ―genetic privacy.‖ As genetic information becomes more 
plentiful and valuable, policies to prevent the misuse of that information will benefit everyone, regardless 
of race or ethnicity. 
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 Science in the twenty-first century has been defined in large part by the successful completion of 
the Human Genome Project. As scientific understanding of the human genome increases, it will shape 
society as well. The human genome represents a source of information that is uniquely both universal 
and personal in nature. The composition and ordering of the chemical constituents of DNA determine 
what molecules are synthesized by all living cells and how living cells adapt to change and stress.1 As 
members of the same species, we share more than ninety-nine percent of our DNA sequence with each 
other, as we all share the same cells, tissues, and organs, all with virtually indistinguishable functions.2 
 Yet each of us can be easily distinguished and identified by the information contained in what 
individual variation remains. Indeed, this tiny fraction of the genome is correlated with differences in 
disease risk, subtle differences in metabolism, physical characteristics, and all kinds of other hereditary 
factors that make us different from one another—possibly even behavioral propensities and personality. 
The promise of using these genetic differences to help tailor diagnostic tools, drug design, and treatment 
planning to maximize therapy and minimize side-effects at the individual level rather than the traditional 
―one-size-fits-all‖ approach has led to widespread excitement and investment around the concept of 
―personalized medicine.‖3 Along with the promise of its benefits, genetic information poses considerable 
                                                 
1 Genetic information is encoded by the specific ordering of the four DNA ―bases,‖ which are typically 
identified by their first initials (Adenine, Thymine, Cytosine, and Guanine). This ordering is called the ―sequence‖ of 
DNA. A fragment of DNA sequence is typically represented as a string of initials representing the bases along one 
strand of the DNA double-helix, e.g. ATCATGACCTGGA. ―Genes‖ are the regions of DNA that encode proteins (the 
molecules that form the structure and perform the functions of living cells). The word ―genome‖ denotes the entire 
DNA sequence of an organism, i.e. the human genome is all the DNA sequence on all the chromosomes combined, 
including all 25,000+ genes, regulatory sequences, and ―junk‖ DNA for which no function has yet been discovered. 
Because new technologies make it so easy to rapidly generate DNA sequence information across large portions of the 
genome, scientists often use the words ―DNA sequence,‖ ―genetic sequence,‖ and ―genomic sequence‖ interchangeably. 
See, e.g., Online Education Kit: Understanding the Human Genome Project, NAT‘L HUM. GENOME RESEARCH INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/25019879 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
2 NAT‘L HUM. GENOME RESEARCH INST., A GUIDE TO YOUR GENOME 1, available at 
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/Education/AllAbouttheHumanGenomeProject/GuidetoYourGenome07.pdf (last 
visited May 5, 2012). 
3 See generally Mara G. Aspinall & Richard G. Hamermesh, Realizing the Promise of Personalized Medicine, 85 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 108 (2007) (describing business models for personalized medicine in the pharmaceutical industry). There is 




risks as well, with the potential of ―personalized‖ stereotyping, stigmatization, and discrimination based 
on the carriage of ―undesirable traits.‖  
 These risks underscore the importance of preserving the privacy of genetic information. Formal 
legal protections for medical patients and genetic research study participants in the United States are 
based on protecting privacy interests primarily through anonymization.4 Privately, biobanks and other 
data collectors also use informed consent covering disclosure risks that may occur despite formally 
mandated protections.5 Recently, federal legislation has been passed in the form of the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (―GINA‖), which generally prohibits the acquisition and use of 
genetic information by health insurance providers and employers.6 While it includes anti-discrimination 
provisions, GINA is fundamentally based on privacy and the nondisclosure of genetic information, and 
prohibits the use of genetic testing by employers. 
 For most Americans, GINA addresses the fantastical problems seen in science fiction movies, 
not real-world problems they experience themselves. However, genetic discrimination already has a 
history in the United States, particularly targeting African Americans within the contexts of employment, 
medical research, and forensic DNA databases used in criminal investigation. In general, genetic testing 
presents racial minorities with the prospect of racial difference being seen as the pre-World War II 
paradigm of fixed biological grounds based on hereditary genetic information, rather than a social 
construction that can be challenged, reformed, and eventually eliminated. This Note analyzes the 
disparate incidence of genetic discrimination against racial minorities, in particular African Americans, as 
exemplified by the past experience of discriminatory genetic testing and present occurrence of genetic 
discrimination in the context of medical research and forensic DNA databases. Looking at genetic 
discrimination through this lens reveals that an approach based on ensuring privacy and focusing on 
individual consent will not work. Rather, policy solutions must be developed that target the specific 
problems generated by the availability of genetic information. 
 The first part of this Note reviews privacy risks specific to DNA sequence data, including the 
practical reasons why anonymity fails. The second part discusses specific risks of genetic information 
misuse, highlighting issues particularly significant for African American and other minority communities. 
Importantly, not only does genetic information misuse cause specific harms, its prevalence has resulted 
in a fear of participation in the next generation of genetic medicine among already disadvantaged 
minorities. The final part describes potential solutions for protecting research participants and others 
from misuse of their genetic information, based on the need to go beyond a practically obsolete privacy-
based framework.  While this Note focuses on the African American experience with genetic 
discrimination, this experience demonstrates that genetic testing poses real threats that exist now and will 
affect a larger population as genetic testing becomes more common. Responding to the specific concerns 
of African Americans—which arise from misuse of genetic testing in the medical context, from the 
categorization and stigmatization of individuals on the basis of genetic disease, and from the risks of the 
use of genetic information by law enforcement—will benefit everyone, regardless of race or ethnicity. 
                                                                                                                                                             
tremendous interest in the field—simply entering ―personalized medicine‖ as a search string in the National Institutes of 
Health‘s PubMed literature yields well over 1000 articles. 
4 See infra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
6 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) [hereinafter 
GINA]. 




I. LIMITS TO PRIVACY AS A PROTECTIVE MEASURE 
 A. Practical Limitations on Genetic Anonymity as a Basis for Privacy 
 The principal mechanism used to prevent privacy risks, both in medical research and in other 
applications, is the separation of personally identifiable information from accompanying DNA.7 The de-
identification or anonymization of data is the only requirement that is actually mandated by federal 
regulations for federally funded research and data associated with medical records.8 Many states 
supplement federal law with additional regulations.9 One of the main concerns of these state regulations 
is to ensure consent for subsequent independent research projects that use preserved samples, which 
otherwise would no longer be under the control of the donor in the absence of a specific contractual 
obligation.10 
 The two primary means for regulating research data are the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (―HIPAA‖)11 and the federal regulation for Protection of Human 
Subjects,12 known as the Common Rule.13 The Common Rule applies to all research involving human 
subjects that is ―conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation‖14 by the federal government. 
This rule applies broadly to all federally funded research, research that takes place using federally funded 
facilities, and private research that is federally regulated, such as clinical trials used to generate data for 
FDA approvals. The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to ―covered entities,‖ including health plans, 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Stephen J. O‘Brien, Stewardship of Human Biospecimens, DNA, Genotype, and Clinical Data in the GWAS 
Era, 10 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 193, 201–02 (2009). 
8 See, e.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 91–92 (2005) 
(describing ethical issues regarding DNA biobanks, in particular informed consent, and the legal protections for privacy 
in the United States). 
9 See generally Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT‘L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/health/genetic-privacy-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 2008) (surveying the status of state genetic privacy laws). 
For example, Arizona has legislation that requires ―specific informed written consent‖ for a genetic test unless otherwise 
specifically authorized by state law (i.e. for forensic DNA databases), as well as ―expressed consent‖ of the test subject 
for the release of the results to any party. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448.02 (2012). Louisiana‘s genetic privacy 
provision makes genetic tests part of the test subject‘s medical record, and thus confidential without ―express written 
consent.‖ LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.6 (2011). Louisiana also has a statutory provision for the collection of genetic 
information by health insurers that defines the insured‘s genetic information as the ―property‖ of the insurer and 
prohibiting its retention by any parties except for criminal and death investigations, and for paternity determination. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(E) (2011). The federal GINA statute would now supersede this provision. 
10 See Katherine Drabiak-Syed, State Codification of Federal Regulatory Ambiguities in Biobanking and Genetic Research, 
30 J. LEGAL MED. 299, 305 (2009) (noting that of the approximately two-thirds of states that have supplemented federal 
regulations, only a few limit third-party release, and only another few address the collection, storage, and future use of 
biological specimens). 
11 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Information, 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2012).  
12 HHS Protection of Human Subjects Rule, 45 C.F.R § 46 (2012); FDA Institutional Review Boards Rule, 21 
C.F.R § 56 (2012). 
13 See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Research Privacy Under HIPAA and the Common Rule, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 154 
(2005) (discussing the relationship between the HIPAA and the Common Rule in regulating the privacy of information 
obtained in the course of experimental studies). 
14 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2012). 




healthcare clearinghouses (e.g. billing services), and healthcare providers that use any kind of electronic 
records.15 
 In practice, much other research takes place under the same terms as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 
even if it does not formally comply, in part because the administrative load on the researching entity is 
not substantially different.16 The Common Rule does not apply to data collected on an anonymous basis, 
while HIPAA may apply if such data are collected on a form that constitutes an applicable medical 
record.17 If such data were collected from an individual whose identity was then removed from the data 
(i.e. de-identified or anonymized data), then the Common Rule and its requirements for informed 
consent would apply.18 
 The HIPAA Privacy Rule sharply restricts the use and disclosure of ―protected health 
information,‖ which is any ―individually identifiable health information‖ held by a covered entity.19 
However, there are no restrictions on the use or disclosure of de-identified health information.20 Health 
information is considered de-identified in two ways. First, a qualified statistician may make a formal 
determination that the information has been de-identified.21 Second, specified identifiers of the 
individual and relatives, household members, and employers, may be removed and the covered entity has 
no actual knowledge that the remaining information could be used to identify the individual.22 This is the 
HIPAA ―Safe Harbor,‖ and examples of such data include names, telephone numbers, email addresses, 
any geographical information except for the first three digits of a zip code (subject to population 
restriction provisions), Social Security numbers, all kinds of account and driver‘s license information, any 
identifying visual information (such as full-face photographs), and any biometrics (like fingerprints).23 
Notably, the covered entity may still retain a code that can be used to re-identify the individual, provided 
the code is adequately protected from decryption and is securely held.24 
 The use of anonymity to protect genome data thus follows the precedent set by decades of other 
kinds of biomedical research, in which the privacy of patients and clinical trial participants is preserved 
by stripping data of personal identifiers in compliance with HIPAA and Common Rule provisions 
described above. The post-genome era of medical research challenges this traditional privacy-based 
                                                 
15 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2012). 
16 See, e.g., Sarah Fendrick, The Role of Privacy Law in Genetic Research, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL‘Y FOR INFO. SOC‘Y 803 
(2008). For example, one difference is that the Common Rule only applies to living research participants, but the 
HIPAA applies to the deceased as well. 
17 See, e.g., Appendix F of the Report of the Secretary‘s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections 
(SACHRP), HHS OFC. FOR HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/appendixf.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2011). 
18 Id. 
19 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2012). 
20 45 C.F.R. § 160.502(d) (2012) (assuming the information required to reestablish re-identification is not 
included in the disclosure). 
21 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2012). 
22 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2012). 
23 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(B) (2012). 
24 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c) (2012). 




approach to medical information. In the past decade since the draft human genome sequence was 
released, it has been clear that the functional consequences of individual genetic variation occurs in many 
different genes throughout the whole human genome, as well as in regions of DNA that are not 
associated with known genes.25 At the same time, advances in DNA sequencing technology have made it 
feasible to cheaply and rapidly obtain a large amount of genomic data from a minute sample of biological 
material, such as from approximately a milliliter of blood or saliva, or even from a cheek swab.26 
Moreover, human genetic research has advanced at the same time as innovation in computation and 
communication technologies. These innovations not only provide the means for storing and analyzing 
massive data sets for individuals, but they also allow the sharing of data sets and their integration to learn 
more about how to interpret the genome. 
 This combination of technological advances enables the key experimental tool for human genetic 
research as it moves beyond the culmination of the Human Genome Project and publication of the first 
full human DNA sequence into the ―post-genome‖ era: the Genome-Wide Association Study 
(―GWAS‖).27 To conduct an effective GWAS requires enrolling as many subjects from as diverse a 
population as possible.28 To this end, the concept of national ―biobanks‖ has been developed to contain 
a combination of DNA sequence information and as much data for potential phenotypes29 about what 
are eventually to be hundreds of thousands of enrolled volunteers. National biobanks have been 
established in Iceland, Japan, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Canada, Sweden, and China, among others, 
and one has been proposed for the United States as well, which are even larger than those currently 
being developed by non-profit research organizations and private pharmaceutical firms.30 In addition, a 
                                                 
25 See 1000 Genomes Project Consortium et al., A Map of Human Genome Variation from Population-Scale Sequencing, 
467 NATURE 1061 (2010) (describing the location of 15 million sites of base variation found in a dataset of fully 
sequenced genomes from 1000 individuals, which is likely to represent over ninety-five percent of variation found in the 
whole human population). 
26 See, e.g., Chunsun Zhang & Da Xing, Miniaturized PCR Chips for Nucleic Acid Amplification and Analysis: Latest 
Advances and Future Trends, 35 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 4223 (2007) (describing chip-based DNA amplification methods that 
can work with sample volumes of as little as 3 µL). 
27 See Teri A. Manolio, Genomewide Association Studies and Assessment of the Risk of Disease, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
166 (2010) (providing an overview of technical challenges related to GWAS and summarizing and linking to over 600 
GWAS publications). Typically in a GWAS, human test subjects are grouped according to some observable variable, for 
example whether they have a particular disease or not, or whether a drug has the desired effect or not, etc. Statistical 
techniques are used to determine all the DNA sequence features that correlate with differences between the groups. 
28 There may be several hundred thousand to millions of genetic features that are compared across whole 
genomes. One of the key principles in statistics is that reliable correlations require that the number of observations 
exceeds the number of variables, which would imply that millions of people have to be enrolled in a GWAS for it to be 
useful. Costs and other practical considerations have meant that most studies only involve thousands or even hundreds 
of participants, and sophisticated statistical methods are used to analyze the data. See John P.A. Ioannidis, A Compendium 
of Genome-Wide Associations for Cancer: Critical Synopsis and Reappraisal, 102 J. NAT‘L CANCER INST. 846 (2010) (using 
statistical analysis as a basis to criticize and reassess the findings of cancer gene risk in most GWAS). 
29 A potential phenotype in this context refers to any variable that could potentially be correlated to some set of 
genetic factors. This can be any imaginable human characteristic, from height, to risk of developing breast cancer by the 
age of 65, to narcotic addiction, to ability to metabolize tryptophan, propensity to be arrested for a crime, and so on. 
While it is more precise to use the word ―phenotype‖ in an actual sense where the genetic link has been established, the 
term is used ambiguously in the genetic literature. See, e.g., O‘Brien, supra note 7. 
30 See, e.g., OECD, CREATION AND GOVERNANCE OF HUMAN GENETIC RESEARCH DATABASES (2006). A list 
of biobanks around the world that are currently members can be found at the Confederation of Cancer Biobanks 
website. Current Members, CONFEDERATION OF CANCER BIOBANKS, http://www.ncri.org.uk/ccb/currentmembers.html 
(last visited May 6, 2012). 




growing number of private ―personal genomics‖ firms are now producing genome sequence information 
for a fee.31 At least one such service, 23andMe, is using the data it collects from its customers to perform 
a progressively more comprehensive GWAS.32 Another emerging venue for GWAS is in the workplace. 
Employees may enroll in health and wellness programs, as well as research into potential occupational 
health hazards, which may have a comprehensive genetic testing component.33 
 Because GWAS research necessarily means large-scale disclosure of individual genomic data, 
preserving informational privacy is a major challenge. As GWAS participation proliferates, three trends 
emerge that compound the risk of inadvertent disclosure of a person‘s identity associated with DNA 
sequence data: first, more databases are being established that store large genomic data sets from more 
people; second, individual data sets from more people are being combined together and associated with 
more detailed phenotype information; and third, data may be obtained from the same individual in 
multiple studies, which means that their genomic data may be stored in multiple databases. Open data 
sharing is critical for progress in human genome research, because so much data are required to interpret 
complex individual variations occurring over large populations with any statistical significance. The 
National Institutes of Health (―NIH‖) has formally established a policy for public release of data from 
federally funded GWAS, stating that ―the NIH believes that the full value of GWAS to the public can be 
realized only if the genotype and phenotype datasets are made available as rapidly as possible to a wide 
range of scientific investigators,‖ in particular due to ―extraordinary opportunities for making 
comparisons across multiple studies.‖34 Restrictions on data openness to preserve privacy have been 
sharply criticized by scientists as potentially limiting the future of genetic research.35 
 Data security methods have practical limitations as well. Measures that try to tweak simple 
anonymization to better obscure the association between personal identity and genomic data have 
practical limitations. In other applications, complex data sets with private information are protected by 
some kind of statistical transformation that reduces its identifiability.36 One possible way of doing this 
with DNA sequence data would be to introduce ―noise‖ into the data set, for example by randomly 
                                                 
31 Katherine Harmon, Genome Sequencing for the Rest of Us, SCI. AM. (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=personal-genome-sequencing. 
32 Nicholas Eriksson et al., Web-Based, Participant-Driven Studies Yield Novel Genetic Associations for Common Traits, 6 
PLOS GENETICS e1000993 (2010). 
33 The text of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) (2008) and regulations promulgated by 
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to implement it explicitly anticipate this possibility. For 
example, GINA sets out as an exception to the prohibition and allows employers to request, require, or purchase genetic 
information where ―health or genetic services are offered by the employer, including such services offered as part of a 
wellness program.‖ GINA § 202(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2012). There is also an exemption to the disclosure 
prohibition ―to an occupational or other health researcher if the research is conducted in compliance with the 
regulations and protections provided for under part 46 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations.‖ GINA §206(b)(2), 42 
U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012). 
34 Policy for Sharing of Data Obtained in NIH Supported or Conducted Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS), NIH 
Notice NOT-OD-07-088, NAT‘L INST. OF HEALTH (Aug. 28, 2007), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-
files/NOT-OD-07-088.html [hereinafter NIH NOTICE]. 
35 Dov Greenbaum et al., Genomics and Privacy: Implications of the New Reality of Closed Data for the Field, 7 PLOS 
COMP BIOLOGY e1002278 (2011). 
36 See, e.g., A. D. Marks & K. K. Steinberg, The Ethics of Access to Online Genetic Databases: Private or Public?, 2 AM. J. 
PHARMACOGENOMICS 207 (2002) (describing the ethical consequences of private versus public genome sequencing 
projects, including the issue of public research projects releasing data freely to the public). 




changing some of the bases in the sequence of a particular individual.37 While this would certainly reduce 
identifiability, it would have a severely adverse impact on the utility of the data. This is because most 
genetic variation between different individuals is in fact in single base sites, so any errors or deliberate 
noise introduced into the data would make it impossible to correlate these variations with any physical or 
disease-related manifestation. It could be possible to use these noise-generating techniques to obscure 
associated personal demographic information or clinical information, but again there would be similar 
costs in terms of the ability to interpret the impact of genetic variation. In addition, researchers have 
suggested ways in which sophisticated cyber-attacks may compromise noising schemes to reveal 
protected data.38 
 An alternative is to encrypt the data and rely on computer and network security mechanisms to 
restrict access and make it harder for someone to employ re-identification techniques. This is the 
approach taken by NIH in putting its public genome databases behind a controlled access firewall (and 
mandating that researchers do so as well).39 This, however, is still an imperfect solution. Many research 
groups will still have access to the data because they need to use it,40 and as a result, the system relies on 
maintaining effective access control to a relatively open network. For the system to succeed and not 
overly inhibit research work by legitimate users, the credentialing process for eligible researchers must 
balance the need for openness and a wide diversity of research users with the need to keep things 
confidential. This means holes will necessarily be left open for unscrupulous exploitation.41 
 The preceding discussion has focused primarily on genetic information collected in the course of 
GWAS. Other DNA sequence data are being collected and stored online, leading to the same issues 
regardless of whether information is accessed by hackers or disclosed voluntarily. The latter is not an 
unrealistic possibility. For example, in the future, people may add genetic data to the information they 
share in online social networks. Even today, some of the people who have used commercial genome 
sequencing technology have released their data to the public under their own names.42 It only costs a few 
hundred dollars now to obtain DNA data on hundreds of thousands of single base variations that are 
associated with disease risk and ancestry. The cost of a whole personal genome sequence is now under 
$20,000, and prices are dropping exponentially. In a legal and regulatory regime that requires preserving 
anonymity as a theoretically effective means of preserving genetic privacy, practically speaking, the 
anonymity approach is facing increasing challenges by the continuous and rapid expansion of access to 
cheap genome sequencing, computation, and communications technology. 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Bee-Chung Chen et al., Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS IN DATABASES 1, 15 
(2009). 
38 Id. at 117–19. 
39 NIH NOTICE, supra note 34. 
40 Id. ―Investigators and institutions seeking data from the NIH GWAS data repository will be expected to 
meet data security measures (such as physical security, information technology security, and user training) and will be 
asked to submit a data access request, including a Data Use Certification, that is co-signed by the investigator and the 
designated Institutional Official(s). Data access requests should include a brief description of the proposed research use 
of the requested GWAS dataset(s).‖ 
41 For example, not only would principal investigators have access to data, but also a variety of graduate 
students, postdoctoral researchers, staff technicians, and casual labor such as undergraduate students. 
42 See, e.g., Data/Code, GENOMES UNZIPPED, available at www.genomesunzipped.org/data (last visited May 6, 
2012) (providing links to the genetic sequence data of Genomes Unzipped consortium members). 




 B. Limited Legal Protections on Genetic Privacy 
 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures, placing a significant limitation on privacy invasion. This limitation presupposes an expectation 
of privacy: specifically, both an individual‘s actual, subjective expectation of privacy and an objectively 
reasonable one.43 A requirement of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy has important 
consequences for genetic information privacy because of how the Fourth Amendment deals with 
―abandoned property.‖44 The Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment protection does not 
extend to property that is abandoned or voluntarily discarded.45 Thus, there is a question about whether 
DNA obtained from discarded property would pose any constitutional issues. 
 This question has played out in different ways. In one recent case, United States v. Davis, the 
defendant was first admitted to a hospital for a gunshot wound, at which point his clothing was searched 
and subsequently confiscated by the police after marijuana was found.46 Then, during a later murder 
investigation, DNA on the clothing was tested and the sample was retained. In a second murder 
investigation, the DNA sample was used to identify the defendant, who then moved to suppress the 
evidence as the product of an illegal search.47 During its analysis of the objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the federal district court noted, 
Nor does the Court necessarily agree that conscious disposal of an item, or unconscious 
shedding of hair, saliva, or dermal cells, reasonably supports the conclusion that an 
individual has manifested an intent to abandon one‘s privacy interest in the information 
that can be gleaned from that item or tissue by DNA analysis. . . . A colorable argument 
could certainly be made that a reasonable societal expectation exists that law 
enforcement officials will not follow individuals around, waiting for an opportunity to 
collect and analyze their DNA without their knowledge or consent.48 
As a result, the court moved onto a Fourth Amendment analysis, and found that in the ―totality of 
circumstances,‖ the search was lawful—though it did fall under constitutional jurisdiction.49 
 However, most courts do not consider abandoned DNA to fall under Fourth Amendment 
protection at all. For example, in Williamson v. State, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state‘s highest 
court, considered the circumstances in which the defendant, while under arrest for unrelated charges, 
was brought a meal from McDonald‘s. The cup he discarded from the meal was tested for a DNA match 
to two rapes that he was suspected of perpetrating.50 The court held that the cup had been abandoned 
                                                 
43 See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
44 See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming ―Abandoned‖ DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 857 (2006). The opinions discussed here cite to the Joh article.  
45 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960). 
46 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (D. Md. 2009). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 649–50. 
49 Id. at 650. 
50 993 A.2d 626, 634 (Md. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 419 (2010). 




and thus the Fourth Amendment did not apply.51 The court noted the Davis result, but it cited only to 
the part of the opinion distinguishing clothing from other cases of abandoned property, ignoring the 
passage quoted above.52 
 Courts have also acknowledged the sensitivity of genomic information in an area in which they 
have endorsed the mandatory collection of genetic data: forensic DNA databases. In allowing the 
collection of DNA for such databases, courts have carefully underlined the fact that such databases 
contain only a limited amount of genetic information required to determine identity.53 Courts analogize 
the DNA in such databases to fingerprints and other means of identification that are not loaded with the 
kind of personal information that a whole sequence would entail, thus limiting the intrusive nature of 
DNA retention.54 But, importantly, while permitting the collection of DNA, these courts have in some 
cases acknowledged that other information can be included in these databases.55 Also, the majorities 
have ignored criticism from dissenters pointing to the possibility that future scientific research may 
reveal that those sequences do contain more information.56 Thus, there is a broad judicial consensus at 
the state and federal levels encouraging the expansion of forensic DNA use and storage beyond just 
those convicted of felonies to those arrested for many kinds of misdemeanors and convicted of any 
crime.57 
 The key limitation on genetic privacy protection is reliance on the reasonable expectation of 
privacy. And, as society becomes more accustomed to routine genetic testing, this expectation is rapidly 
diminishing.  As the Davis court suggested once it turned to its Fourth Amendment analysis and 
balancing the defendant‘s privacy interest, ―In this day and age, where DNA testing is referenced almost 
daily in the news and on popular television series such as ‗CSI‘ and ‗NCIS,‘ this certainly should have put 
Davis on notice that his DNA could someday be tested.‖58 Thus, there is arguably no reasonable 
expectation of privacy left in genetic information as it pertains to identification. 
                                                 
51 Id. at 635. 
52 Id. at 641. 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (―Through the use of short tandem 
repeat technology (‗STR‘), the Bureau analyzes the presence of various alleles located at 13 markers (or loci) on DNA 
present in the specimen. These STR loci are each found on so-called ‗junk DNA‘—that is, non-genic stretches of DNA 
not presently recognized as being responsible for trait coding—and were purposely selected because they are not 
associated with any known physical or medical characteristics.‖). 
54 See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005) (―[W]e see the intrusion on privacy . . . as similar 
to the intrusion wrought by the maintenance of fingerprint records.‖). 
55 The Kincade court, for example, acknowledges that the DNA profiles may identify race or sex. 379 F.3d at 
818. 
56 See, e.g., id. at 850 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). See also the Second Circuit‘s tacit acknowledgment of scientific 
uncertainty in Nicholas: ―DNA databases like New York‘s utilize ‗junk DNA,‘ which does not (as far as we know) contain 
genetic information.‖ 430 F.3d at 656, n.3 (emphasis added). 
57 See, e.g., Dean G. Skelos, Senate Passes DNA Databank Expansion Bill (Jan. 31, 2012), www.nysenate.gov/press-
release/senate-passes-dna-databank-expansion-bill (describing the New York State Senate‘s passage of legislation 
supported by Governor Cuomo to require those convicted of all felonies, and misdemeanors in the penal law, to supply 
DNA samples). 
58 United States v. Davis, 657 F. Supp. 2d 630, 651–52 (D. Md. 2009) (emphasis in original). 




 The Fourth Amendment analysis on the reasonable expectation of privacy also applies to state 
action. However, even where at the state level there is constitutional privacy protection that does not 
require state action, as in under the California constitution, courts have analyzed the privacy right the 
same way by requiring a ―reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstance.‖59 There is the 
additional possibility that privacy tort law could provide an alternative mechanism for preventing the use 
of information that could be obtained from abandoned DNA. Such an action would be based on the 
publication of information about a person without consent.  
Privacy tort actions may be brought when a matter regarding private life is publicized, such that 
it ―(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the 
public.‖60 In some cases, the fact of an invasion of privacy is non-controversial; in particular, ―facts 
related to an individual‘s sexual relations, or ‗unpleasant or disgraceful‘ illnesses, are considered private in 
nature and the disclosure of such facts constitutes an invasion of the individual‘s right of privacy.‖61 An 
example would be a person‘s positive HIV status.62 However, not all nonconsensual revelations of 
genetic information constitute a tortious invasion of privacy. Genetic information may be negative for 
disease risk, or it could be relatively benign information such as eye color. Thus, a successful privacy tort 
action brought for genetic information would likely be limited to cases in which real harm occurs, such 
as through discrimination or stigmatization. 
 Even beyond this caveat, the privacy tort is sharply limited by free speech rights.63 Genetic 
information may be published if it is already in the public record64 or if it is ―newsworthy,‖ a broad 
description that includes even such deeply private information as the names of rape victims65 or the 
homosexuality of public figures.66 Indeed, there is precedent from wiretapping law suggesting that even 
                                                 
59 The California state constitution includes the provision, amended by referendum, ―All people are by nature 
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.‖ CALIF. CONST. ART. 1 § 
1 (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court has held that the provision requires ―that a plaintiff alleging an 
invasion of privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish each of the following: (1) a 
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by 
defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.‖ Hill v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n., 865 P.2d 633, 657 (Cal. 
1994). See also Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the 
California constitutional claim by following its Fourth Amendment balancing of ―reasonable expectation‖ and 
government interests). 
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D (1977). 
61 Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377 (Colo. 1997). 
62 See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
63 See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of A Right to Stop 
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000) (arguing that almost any privacy protection that would 
allow someone to unilaterally limit another‘s expression rights necessarily would be unconstitutional). 
64 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975) (―[E]ven the prevailing law of invasion of privacy 
generally recognizes that the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public 
record.‖). 
65 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
66 Sipple v. Chron. Publ‘g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (Cal. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that the homosexuality of a 
plaintiff who had intervened to grab the arm of a man attempting to assassinate President Gerald Ford was newsworthy 
and could thus be publicized). 




if genetic information were to be obtained through unlawful means and then turned over to the media, 
the information may be broadcast.67 In general, while there may be some scope for statutory or common 
law mechanisms to prevent the publication of genetic information without consent, it will be limited by 
the First Amendment. It is unclear how privacy laws based on the reasonable expectation of privacy will 
translate to a future of ubiquitous genetic information. 
II. PAST AND CONTINUING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION TARGETING  
 RACIAL MINORITIES 
 A. Racially Targeted Genetic Testing 
 While genetic testing is increasingly a fact of life for all Americans, African Americans have had a 
longer and more problematic history of adverse consequences and controversial applications of testing 
for hereditary conditions. This is exemplified by the legislative findings supporting GINA. Since 
Congress crafted GINA following the framework of other antidiscrimination legislation, the Act 
contains findings that include a history of genetic discrimination, but in doing so, GINA‘s drafters were 
limited by genetic testing‘s necessarily limited history.68 The specific examples that are in the Act arise 
from testing that targeted African Americans in particular. The Findings describe screening for carriers 
of sickle cell anemia, a disease that mostly affects African Americans. The screening, which began in the 
1970‘s, was imposed on African Americans specifically to determine health insurance coverage, to decide 
whether they had the qualifications to join and remain in the military, for permission to play high school 
athletics, and as a condition for employment.69 Eventually, sickle cell disease testing was actually 
mandated by state legislatures.70 GINA‘s Findings also refer to Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory71, a case about sickle cell testing that represents the only appellate decision about pre-
employment genetic screening from the era prior to GINA‘s passage. 
 The laboratory, which was run by a federal contractor, collected blood and urine samples from 
all employees, and plaintiffs sued for invasion of privacy due to syphilis, pregnancy, and sickle cell testing 
that was done on the samples without informing employees.72 The latter genetic test for sickle cell 
                                                 
67 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that even though the information in question was 
known to have been obtained through an illegal wiretap, the media could report it because it was newsworthy). 
68 See generally Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 
63 VAND. L. REV. 439 (2010) (discussing evidence supporting and detracting from a history of genetic discrimination 
and detailing GINA proponents‘ concession of the Act‘s ―preemptive‖ and anticipatory nature). 
69 Diane Beeson & Troy Duster, African American Perspectives on Genetic Testing, in THE DOUBLE-EDGED HELIX: 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 152, 154 (Joseph S. Alper et al. eds., 2002). 
70 GINA, Pub. L. 110-233, § 2(3), 122 Stat. 881 (2008). Congress did pass the National Sickle Cell Anemia 
Control Act in 1972, which withheld federal funding from states with mandatory screening programs, and broad 
screening programs led to the first state anti-discriminatory laws. Pub. L. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136 (1972). 
71 GINA § 2(4), referring to Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). See 
also Elizabeth Pendo, Race, Sex, and Genes at Work: Uncovering the Lessons of Norman-Bloodsaw, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL‘Y 227 (2010) (describing in detail the history of the case with a particular focus on aspects related to race and gender 
that are often neglected in favor of discussing personal privacy issues). Another case on record regarding sickle cell 
disease testing is Jones v. Inter-County Imaging Centers, 889 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying defendants‘ motion for 
summary judgment on the ADA claim, but publishing no details of the opinion). 
72 Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1265. The University of California had a contract with the United States 
Department of Energy to run this particular laboratory. 




disease was done only on samples from black employees, and it continued through June 1995.73 The 
Ninth Circuit determined that the Fourth Amendment applied, rejecting the lower court‘s determination 
that testing was ―de minimis‖ and thus no violation of privacy occurred ―in light of (1) the ‗large overlap‘ 
between the subjects covered by the medical questionnaire and the three tests and (2) the ‗overall 
intrusiveness‘ of ‗a full-scale physical examination.‘‖74 Moreover, the court recognized that the non-
consensual screening for sickle cell disease raised a potentially valid Title VII claim, since only black 
employees were affected.75 Although the court did not make note of it, despite sickle cell anemia‘s 
association with Africa, it is found in members of other ethnicities as well, merely at lower—but non-
negligible—rates.76 
 After the Norman-Bloodsaw case, genetics and race continue to interact in medical research. This is 
in part because of physicians‘ entrenched beliefs that race and ethnicity affect medical risk. For example, 
in a recent study of pediatricians on the issue of mandatory sickle cell genetic screening for student-
athletes, a much higher percentage supported screening targeted by race and ethnicity than supported 
universal screening.77 Presumably, such attitudes might be seen as changing over time.  
 Contrary to such expectations, however, contemporary genetic research threatens to result in the 
―reification of race,‖ where biological language reenters the discourse of racial differences that are 
otherwise considered to be social categories.78 This may seem counter-intuitive. Since the advent of 
DNA sequencing, it has been clear that interracial genetic diversity is a small fraction of total individual 
diversity (itself the mere <1% of variation cited above).79 This science-based challenge to the biological 
                                                 
73 Id. The testing program ended, in fact, because African American adults had almost all been tested at birth at 
that time. The testing of African Americans for the sickle cell trait of course implicates substantial issues of racial 
discrimination, and it motivated much of the legislative concern over genetic information privacy in the United States 
prior to the Human Genome Project‘s inception in the early 1990s. Indeed, it may account for why many states had 
genetic information privacy laws on the books long before such statutes were developed in other countries (though at 
the federal level, GINA was not passed until 2008). 
74 Id. at 1269. 
75 Id. at 1272. 
76 See, e.g., Eugene F. Roth, Jr. et al., Sickle Cell Disease in Sicily, 17 J. MED. GENETICS 34 (1980). 
77 Joy Koopmans et al., Sickle Cell Trait Screening in Athletes: Pediatricians‘ Attitudes and Concerns, 128 PEDIATRICS 
477, 477 (2011). The study was based on activities pursuant to a rule of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) requiring mandatory sickle cell genetic testing of student athletes in Division I programs to take place in the 
first season during which they are eligible to compete. The mandatory testing rule was enacted in 2010 as part of a 
settlement between the NCAA and the family of Dale Lloyd II, a nineteen-year-old Rice University football player 
whose death in 2006 after a practice was attributed to sickle cell trait. Vence L. Bonham et al., Screening Student Athletes for 
Sickle Cell Trait—A Social and Clinical Experiment, 363 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 997, 997 (2010). 
78 See generally GUY P. HARRISON, RACE AND REALITY: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT OUR 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (2009); AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A 
WORLDVIEW (3d ed. 2007); Troy Duster, Race and Reification in Science, 307 Sci. 1050 (2005); William M. Richman, Genetic 
Residues of Ancient Migrations: An End to Biological Essentialism and the Reification of Race, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 387 (2006). 
79 See, e.g., Richard C. Lewontin, The Apportionment of Human Diversity, 6 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 381 (1972) 
(the first study of inter-racial variation using samples obtained from blood cells); P.C. Ng et al., Individual Genomes Instead 
of Race for Personalized Medicine, 84 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY THERAPY 306 (2008) (the first study of inter-individual and 
inter-racial genetic variation using the whole DNA sequence). 




concept of race was advanced by the human genome project‘s government sponsors.80 In celebrating the 
culmination of the project, President Clinton stated: ―In genetic terms all human beings, regardless of 
race, are more than 99.9 percent the same. . . . Modern science has confirmed what we first learned from 
ancient faiths. The most important fact of life on this earth is our common humanity.‖81  
 This rhetoric nevertheless conceals a paradox arising from the length and complexity of DNA 
sequence. Even a small fraction of total variation represents enough information to distinguish between 
groups of people that correlate with ancestry, and thus, roughly, with race.82 The significance of 
ethnicity-based (if not outright race-based) medical research is underscored by the pharmaceutical giant 
GlaxoSmithKline‘s investment in assembling a DNA database resource with information from almost 
6,000 people from explicitly African American, East Asian, South Asian, Mexican, and European 
origins.83 Scientists investigating racial disparities in health outcomes have also used genetic testing to 
verify the degree of African ancestry in study participants.84 
 The interweaving of race and genetic medicine was made even more explicit with the FDA‘s 
2005 approval of BiDil, a combination drug for use specifically in African Americans to treat congestive 
heart failure.85 The FDA initially rejected BiDil, but after re-analyzing the data from the failed clinical 
trial, the drug‘s developers found a potentially beneficial effect among African American patients 
enrolled in the trial.86 This led the researchers to design an FDA-approved clinical trial to study the drug 
in an exclusive African American population, in which they found a statistically significant impact.87 The 
                                                 
80 Human Genome Project Information: Minorities, Race, and Genomics, U.S. DEP‘T OF ENERGY, 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/minorities.shtml (last visited Aug. 31, 2007). 
81 Nicholas Wade, Now, the Hard Part: Putting the Genome to Work, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, 
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BIOMARKERS PREV. 1329 (2008); K. Brye et al. Genome-Wide Patterns of Population Structure and Admixture in West Africans 
and African Americans, 107 PROC. NAT‘L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 786 (2010) (describing studies that identified groups according 
to African American or proximate West African descent). 
83 M. R. Nelson et al., The Population Reference Sample, POPRES: A Resource for Population, Disease, and 
Pharmacological Genetics Research, 83 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 347 (2008).  
84 Yaeger, supra note 82 (comparing African ancestry as referenced to a West African and African American 
database versus self-identification survey results). 
85 Andrew Pollack, Drug Approved for Heart Failure in Black Patients, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at C1. BiDil is the 
trade name for isosorbide dinitrate/hydralazine, a combination vasoldilator and antihypertensive. Both drugs had already 
been approved for treatment individually, so only the combination was novel. 
86 Id. See also Jay N. Cohn, The Vasodilator-Heart Failure Trials (V-HeFT): Mechanistic Data from the VA Cooperative 
Studies, 87 CIRCULATION VI-1-4 (1993).  
87 Anne L. Taylor et al., The African-American Heart Failure Trial: Background, Rationale and Significance, 94 J. NAT‘L 
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FDA subsequently approved BiDil as a drug for the ―treatment of heart failure as an adjunct to standard 
therapy in self-identified black patients to improve survival, to prolong time to hospitalization for heart 
failure, and to improve patient-reported functional status.‖88 BiDil‘s approval led to substantial debate on 
scientific, political, and ethical grounds, and it continues to be prominently highlighted in discussions 
surrounding genetic medicine generally.89 One of the principal scientific grounds for the critique of BiDil 
was that the data emphasized by the drug maker and the FDA was very controversial. It purported to 
show dramatically higher African American mortality rates due to heart failure.90 However, some studies 
have shown that disparities in hypertension among African American men are highly correlated with 
socioeconomic status, overwhelming any measurable genetic difference even if one exists.91 
 The debate over BiDil exemplifies the problems associated with incorporating the analysis of 
genetic information into the study of racial disparities in medicine.92 It is true that genetic differences 
along ethnic lines may merely reflect the natural genetic similarity that results from shared ancestry and 
geographic origin.93 And, indeed, there are geographical concentrations of phenotype that may be due to 
shared ancestry and consequent genetic similarities, such as the prevalence of hereditary sickle cell 
disease in Africa;94 the inability to metabolize alcohol in parts of Asia;95 and beta thalassemia, otherwise 
                                                 
88 BiDil Package Insert - Final Draft, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 23, 2005),available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2005/020727lbl.pdf. This is the label approved on June 23, 2005 
by the FDA. Approved Drug Products, BIDIL, NDA 020727, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
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Limitations and Its Impact on PGX Research and Clinical Opportunity, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH & POL‘Y 153, 164–68, 177–81 
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(2008) (disputing the statistical significance of the observed difference between Black and White patients in the trial). But 
see also Britt M. Rusert & Charmaine D. M. Royal, Grassroots Marketing in a Global Era: More Lessons from BiDil, 39 J.L. MED 
& ETHICS 79, 84–86 (2011) (describing support within the African-American community and outreach by BiDil‘s 
manufacturer targeting community organizations). 
90 Duster, supra note 89, at 703 (discussing how the mortality discrepancies appear entirely based on age effects 
in the cohort, in which a disproportionate number of people aged forty-five to sixty-four dying but representing only six 
percent of the total population distorting the final results in a statistically insignificant manner). 
91 Michael J. Klag et al., The Association of Skin Color with Blood Pressure in US Blacks with Low Socioeconomic Status, 
265 J. AM. MED. ASS‘N 599, 599-602 (1991) (showing that pigmentation intensity correlates with hypertension, but that 
this correlation is well-explained by differences in socioeconomic status); see also Richard S. Cooper et al., An International 
Comparison Study of Blood Pressure in Populations of European vs. African descent, 3 BMC MED. 22 (2005). 
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example, in 2005, the FDA issued a Public Health Advisory for the cholesterol-lowering drug Crestor targeted to Asian 
Americans specifically. Public Health Advisory for Crestor (rosuvastatin), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 2, 2005), 
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93 Nelson et al., supra note 83. 
94 See, e.g., A. P. Gelpi, Migrant Populations and the Diffusion of the Sickle-Cell Gene, 79 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 258, 
258-64 (1973). 




known as ―Mediterranean‖ anemia.96 Thus, some inter-group biological differences are genetic; but these 
are differences between ethnicities, not necessarily the social constructs of race that have developed in 
the American context. There may even still be pragmatic utility in using ―African American‖ and 
―Hispanic American‖ as racial groupings in medical genetics research; for example, it may be a way to 
ensure that members of minority communities are adequately represented in genetic studies.97 
 That said, many scholars reject the notion that racial classifications are biologically meaningful 
and instead propose that not only should health disparity research be focused on environmental and 
socioeconomic considerations, but also that any association of race with biological outcomes is 
harmful.98 For example, a study that classifies African Americans as a group more likely to develop lung 
cancer as a result of cigarette smoking due to presence of a particular genetic mutation will be reported 
in such a way that it ignores the large minority of non-African Americans who share the same mutation 
and have a higher rate of smoking.99 The study thus overlooks the alternative conclusion that economic 
factors, social context, or environmental factors like pollution might make African Americans more likely 
to develop nicotine addiction or suffer from lung cancer.100 Indeed, at least one study that carefully 
compared head and neck cancer outcomes among patients who self-declared their race and their 
genetically-identified ancestry revealed that health outcomes were correlated with self-declared social 
conceptions of race, as opposed to ―biological‖ ancestry.101 Where such an approach has not been used, 
the outcome of research intended to solve the problem of racial disparities in health outcomes may only 
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reinforce the social inequality that caused the disparities in the first place, by purportedly confirming old 
stereotypes or introducing new ones.102  
 B. Disparate Racial Impact of Forensic DNA Databases 
 Many of the aforementioned negative consequences of race-based genetic research depend on 
whether scientists continue to conduct such studies. However, substantial racial disparity already exists in 
the use of DNA to identify criminal suspects. Forensic applications of DNA are almost as old as the 
development of technology to detect areas of specific inter-individual variation. In 1985, Alec Jeffreys, 
the inventor of ―DNA fingerprinting‖ technology, employed his then year-old method to resolve an 
immigration case.103 Shortly thereafter, the technology was used to identify the perpetrator of a double 
homicide.104 In the United States, the DNA Identification Act of 1994 funded national DNA analysis 
laboratory facilities and gave the FBI the authority to establish a nationwide database of DNA records.105 
Subsequent legislation expanded the scope of what DNA could be acquired and retained. The most 
recent of which is the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,106 which authorizes DNA 
sample collection from all individuals arrested, facing charges, or convicted under the authority of the 
United States.107 This federal legislation is similar to several state mandates, including California, 
Maryland, and New Jersey, to collect DNA of persons with multiple felony arrests, and all fifty states 
collect DNA from all state offenders.108 
 Because virtually everyone in the state and federal DNA databases (between which information 
is shared) was at one point either arrested or convicted of a crime, the racial distribution of samples 
within the databases generally reflect the overall racial disparity in arrests and convictions.109 For 
example, in Maryland, which tracks the demographics of the population from whom DNA samples are 
collected, 60.9% of those sampled were African American, whereas 35.0% who were White.110 Among 
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the state population as a whole, 63.0% are White and 29.7% are African American.111 In the United 
States as a whole, an estimated 28.3% of those arrested in 2009 were African American,112 as compared 
to 12.9% of the general population.113  
 While this overwhelming racial disparity in individual DNA samples in the database raises 
troubling questions on its own,114 it becomes particularly salient in view of new approaches that go 
beyond the model of a database restricted to those actively convicted or even arrested of crimes.115 
Where no match was found in the existing database, DNA samples have been used to attempt to predict 
a suspect‘s racial or ethnic origin.116 This explicitly racial use of forensic DNA analysis echoes the race-
based medical research questions discussed above and raises important issues regarding racial profiling 
and the potential for reinforcing stereotypes associated with criminal behavior—or perhaps the use of 
more insidious categories, such as those associated with genetic traits thought to be explicitly predictive 
of behavior.117 
 Of more immediate applicability is the growing interest in kinship or familial DNA searches for 
forensic use. In these kinds of database searches, when no exact match to a database is found, a near 
match is correlated with a suspect‘s family member whose genetic information is available to law 
enforcement.118 Based on theoretical models, scientists have predicted that using familial DNA searches 
could increase the ―cold-hit‖ rate (match between a sample obtained at the crime scene and an entry 
already in the database) by as much as forty percent.119 This technique is already being used. For 
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example, police investigators in California recently identified the suspected ―Grim Sleeper‖ serial 
murderer by first obtaining a close DNA match to an individual in a forensic database, and then using 
familial relationship data found in public records to identify the suspect himself.120 Scholars have 
questioned the ethical issues regarding privacy in familial DNA searching, which include violating the 
privacy of the individual whose sample is in the DNA database already, as well as violating the privacy of 
a potentially large pool of possible relatives.121 Moreover, familial DNA searches may unexpectedly 
reveal hits and misses that disrupt family structure, by finding a genetic link where one was previously 
unknown or revealing the absence of such a link that was thought to exist.122  
 There is also a high potential for the use of familial DNA searching to increase the already 
racially disparate impact of forensic DNA testing. Given that African Americans and increasingly other 
minority populations are dramatically overrepresented in forensic DNA databases, the number of their 
relatives who will be potentially captured through familial searching will be even more exponentially 
overrepresented.123 It has been suggested that if proper precautions are taken, such as ensuring the 
destruction of DNA samples associated with innocent family members, kinship searches may not be as 
problematic as claimed since they can be used equally well to demonstrate innocence.124 However, as 
other commentators have pointed out, familial matches inherently produce only partial matches, which 
would be of limited exoneration value.125 Any such benefit is outweighed by the risk that a minority 
community overrepresented in the forensic database would find itself potentially cast entirely within the 
net of the database supplemented by kinship searches.126 Thus, while there is no ―universal‖ DNA 
database of all Americans, there may soon be effectively such a database for African Americans, and 
increasingly, other minorities that share common genetic ancestry. 
 C. Skepticism About DNA Testing among Minority Communities 
 Racial minorities, in particular African Americans, are massively underrepresented in genetic 
studies. As of August 2009, 320 of 373 publicly known GWAS were entirely made up of European 
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ancestry, with over 1.5 million participants.127 There were no studies of only African Americans, and of 
just eleven studies with mixed populations, the average size of the African American population (crucial 
to get statistically meaningful results) was just 682, as opposed to 8403 for populations with European 
ancestry.128 Given the issues raised in the previous sections, one might hypothesize that racial minorities, 
and African Americans in particular, would have concerns about the potential risks of genetic testing. 
After all, as discussed previously, African Americans have a concrete experience with many of the kinds 
of misuse of genetic information that are otherwise hypothetical to majority populations, such as 
profiling for forensic investigation, misuse of genetic testing in the employment context, and use of 
genetic information to reify socioeconomic differences as reflecting physical distinction in the medical 
context. 
 Indeed, while survey data are not unanimous, the trend of several studies clearly supports this 
hypothesis, in addition to showing mistrust of genetic information misuse in other minority populations, 
among whom studies have been more limited.129 African American attitudes toward genetic testing may 
also be influenced by more prevalent mistrust of medical research and health care. For example, in one 
survey of African American patients, respondents, as compared to White respondents, were (1) more 
likely than White respondents not to trust that their physician would fully explain research participation, 
(2) less likely to believe that they could freely ask their physician questions, (3) more likely to disagree 
that their physician would not ask them to participate in research the physician thought would harm 
them, (4) more likely to believe that someone like them could be used in a genetic study without consent, 
and (5) much more likely to believe that physicians often prescribed medication as a way of 
experimenting on people without consent and that even their own physicians had given treatment as part 
of an experiment without consent.130 To explain this repeatedly observed phenomenon of medical 
mistrust, most authors immediately bring up the specific experience of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study as a 
principal reason why African Americans have a mistrust of the system.131 However, studies that have 
specifically investigated the actual significance of Tuskegee in explaining attitudes have suggested that it 
is not the sole trigger for mistrust.132 
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 Suspicion of health care professionals and the history of medical research adverse to African 
Americans is not the only reason why they do not trust genetic research. For example, African 
Americans and other minority communities have also had a history and have an ongoing present 
experience of discrimination at the hands of law enforcement, which provides a reinforcing context 
enhancing the concerns expressed within these communities concerning racial disparities in the forensic 
DNA databases and the risk of selective investigation.133 As the studies described in this section 
demonstrate, the fear of potential misuse of genetic information, motivated by all of the reasons 
described above, plays a significant role in making African Americans hesitate to participate in genetic 
studies and worry about the outcomes of such research. 
 For example, a study of nurses attending the 2006 Annual Conference of the National Black 
Nurses Association found that while a majority were interested in genetic testing and were willing to 
participate in genetic education, more than seventy-five percent believed that genetic tests could be used 
to discriminate against minorities.134 Supporting this view was a recent focus group on attitudes towards 
personalized medicine which showed that African Americans simultaneously encouraged by the 
development of genetic testing for personalized medicine and suspicious of the use of race to tailor 
medicine, with BiDil as a specific example.135 In a study of consent to a large-scale genetic study, while 
African American participants consented to the immediate study at similar levels to others, they were the 
least likely, by a statistically significant margin, to consent to save blood samples long term.136 
 In a 2004 study of attitudes towards breast cancer gene testing, study participants had a positive 
view of the likely applications of genetic tests for medicine and research that was uniform across all racial 
categories. After adjustment for age, gender, and educational level, however, African Americans were 
more likely to believe that the government ―would use genetic tests to label groups as inferior, and less 
likely to endorse the potential health benefits of testing.‖137 In 2008, a team studying participants in a 
GWAS on colon cancer risks compared the response to open-ended questions about genetic testing: 
African Americans proved as likely as other groups to express willingness to participate in future 
studies.138 But, once prompted by closed-ended question with specific examples of negative 
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consequences, they were less likely to feel very positive about genetic variation research generally and 
were more likely to express concerns than other study participants.139 
 These results only represent a sample of many studies of African American and other minority 
community participation and attitudes towards genetic testing.140 Although the trend is not unanimous, 
two themes seem to frequently recur: African Americans (and in fewer studies, Hispanic participants) are 
generally as enthusiastic as other study participants about the potential benefits of genetic testing, while 
simultaneously they are much more cautious or even pessimistic about potential risks. This accords with 
the hypothesis one might draw of African American reluctance to participate in genetic testing based on 
history and experience with genetic testing in the past, as well as concrete fears about genetics 
reinforcing racial inequality.  
 Besides the significance of this analysis in understanding attitudes toward genetic testing 
generally, there is a real practical concern with the reluctance to participate in genetic studies 
demonstrated by African Americans and underrepresented minorities. For example, while the important 
breast cancer risk genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 were identified in 1990 in a study of women of European 
origin, until recently there had been no study of breast cancer genetic epidemiology within an African 
American population.141 Many genetic variants connected to disease risk are rare in the population taken 
as a whole, so they may be missed if the people who have the variant happen to be members of minority 
groups who do not want to participate in studies. This affects everyone, since, as discussed above in the 
context of the sickle cell trait, even if such a variant is found more frequently within a racial minority, it 
can certainly still be present in the majority as well.142 Alternatively, a variant that is found in only in a 
small number of people may still be the basis for developing a new therapeutic drug with broader 
benefits.143 Thus, effective genetic research requires broad participation. The perception that 
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participation increases the risk of adverse effects of genetic discrimination will therefore substantially 
hinder the effort to use the discoveries of the Human Genome Project to improve human health.= 
III. BEYOND PRIVACY: EXPLICITLY PROHIBITING MISUSE OF GENETIC   
 INFORMATION 
 A. New Challenges Presented by Genetic Information 
 In the context of the kind of medical research applications that are the focus of this Note, it is 
natural to identify genetic data as medical information. So, it is natural to first think of protecting genetic 
information in the same way as we protect other medical records: by restricting disclosure of records 
associated with personal identifiers. However, genetic sequences are not like typical medical information 
at all. First, any large sets of combinatorial data can be identifiable, as described for clinical data and as 
has been demonstrated in the case of consumer records, most notably in a recent controversial contest 
run by Netflix.144 However, even more so than such data sets, a genetic sequence is identifiable on its 
own, as an individual record. Consider this paradox: the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits the disclosure of 
genetic information provided it is stripped of personal identifiers—but included on the list of prohibited 
identifiers are ―[b]iometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints.‖145 Even a small fraction of 
DNA sequence information is more personally identifiable than a fingerprint, which depends at least 
somewhat on human interpretation.146 In addition, a solution that would restrict the amount of genetic 
data in a record, or modify data to prevent identification, would necessarily also conflict with the medical 
usefulness of the data. 
 There is another important way in which DNA sequence is unlike any other medical 
information: physical samples containing DNA can be easily stored without significant degradation,147 
and even more unlike other biological specimens, actual DNA material needs to be kept intact and whole 
to retain the entirety of the information it contains. This makes it difficult to employ sample destruction, 
another conventionally employed solution for maintaining privacy. Even if all the tissue obtained in the 
course of an experiment is lost, all the information within a DNA sequence can remain stored on a 
computer disk or easily transmitted across the Internet. The deletion of the sequence data may be 
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mandated, as is done now for expunging DNA records maintained by law enforcement agencies.148 
However, mandating this approach for proliferating public and privacy DNA databases is limited by 
practical limits on auditing procedures needed to ensure that all files and copies thereof are in fact 
removed. 
 Even if genetic records could be effectively controlled and reliably destroyed, in many cases the 
utility of DNA information is such that it can be stored indefinitely. A forensic DNA database is useful 
for law enforcement because it allows matching samples taken from future crime scenes. The 
information contained within a research biobank should be accessible by future researchers. Biobanks 
are also intended to be dynamic, with new participants being continuously added along with clinical 
information taken throughout their lifespans that allow correlations to future disease risk as participants 
in the study age. 
 B. Proposed Consent-Based Solutions 
 Given that the research application of DNA information collides with expectations for medical 
privacy, one solution might be to expand the scope of informed consent by ensuring that study 
participants fully understand the risks of disclosure and consent to how much individual control they 
may exert over the continued storage of genetic information and use of the information in future 
research. Informed consent procedures are also practically appealing in that they do not require 
significant legislative efforts. One example of this approach is the extensive consent form used by the 
personal genomics service, 23andMe, for the studies it performs on data submitted by its customers, 
which includes specific information (either directly or following hyperlinks) on the uses of the data, 
benefits, risks, and data protection mechanisms.149 
 One prominent genetic scientist, George Church, has proposed a more general solution along 
these lines. It takes advantage of open access, communal regulatory frameworks that have emerged in the 
Internet, the ―Creative Commons Universal Waiver.‖150 This approach, which is used by the Personal 
Genomics Project,151 tries to involve the community as broadly as possible, recognizing that 
individualized consent is limited by the risk posed to relatives who do not consent. The goal is a 
dynamically evolving framework for consent that adapts to changing technology and public 
understanding. The enhanced consent strategy employs comprehension tests as a means to ensure that 
the consenter understands the complex scientific and ethical issues within the information accompanying 
the consent interface. Some have argued that this approach would help integrate genetic information 
across multiple studies, which is otherwise hampered by limited consent procedures and HIPAA 
restrictions, but would greatly enhance the ability to gain medical insight from the data.152 
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 An even more radical proposal is to recruit ―information altruists‖ who would fully comprehend 
all the risks of research but voluntarily contribute their sequences for the advancement of medical 
research.153 These could indeed be the same individuals who voluntarily disclose their sequence 
information in public anyway. Some people may not mind such public disclosure, as they recognize that 
DNA sequence information is at most probabilistic, and that environment is most important for 
determining future disease or other sensitive characteristics, such as behavior or intelligence. Information 
altruists may also be required to obtain consent from immediate family members, which would at least 
mitigate the problem of any individual-based consent scheme in that it may lead to the unwanted de-
identification of DNA sequence information from close relatives. 
 Nevertheless, voluntary information altruists would still risk having the data used to identify 
them in other contexts, such as in the course of a civil or criminal investigation, or as part of a medical 
study in which they have been diagnosed with a disease they wish to keep private. A study was recently 
undertaken to determine the effect of education prior to consent in a GWAS. The authors found that 
84% of participants chose public data release, with anonymization, prior to learning about re-
identification risks. After receiving such education, only 53% chose public release, 33% chose restricted 
access in a password-protected database, and 14% opted out of data sharing.154 It is quite likely that such 
numbers would drop even more once there are cases of misuse of genetic data, which would actualize 
those risks that are only hypothetical and speculative today, unless one has shared in the experience of 
racial minorities as outlined above in Part III. Many people may also believe that there would be legal 
protections over their informational privacy even in light of the identification of their sequence, which as 
discussed in Part II.B may not necessarily be true. 
 In general, informed consent arises from the belief that as people have more knowledge about 
genetic technology and its potential risks, participation in research and disclosure of genetic information 
will be encouraged. But, what if fears of genetic information disclosure are not associated with education 
about genetic technology? As discussed in Part III.C, surveys of African Americans have consistently 
shown pervasive concerns about the risks of genetic research. These concerns exist even alongside the 
enthusiasm about the benefits of genetic research.155 Significantly, African Americans are confronted 
with their disparate experience with forensic DNA databases and the risk of being caught in the genetic 
―dragnets‖ of familial searching, as discussed in Part III.B. Given that no appellate court has prevented 
genetic identification based on abandoned DNA in criminal investigations, confidence in an informed 
consent regime that could not be pierced by a criminal investigation with limited legal protection is 
unlikely. Because consent-based solutions are focused on the problem of medical research trial 
participation, without considering other uses of genetic data, they would not address the actual concerns 
African Americans have with the consequences of genetic research. 
 C. Alternative Problem-Specific Strategies 
 Any problems that appear more threatening among racial minorities are likely to affect members 
of the majority as well. The attitudes that African Americans express about genetic testing, discussed in 
Section III, are salient beyond their community. African Americans have a particular experience with 
sickle cell disease carrier screening and overrepresentation in forensic DNA databases, along with the 
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fear of reification of racial inequality as a result of genetic research in medicine. In these ways, they have 
had to face the reality of problems that, for the majority, are largely in the domain of science fiction. 
Given that genetic information (even in the limited sense of sickle cell disease carrier status) has already 
been misused, and that it is currently being misused in the case of kinship searching, there is a concrete 
basis for identifying at least some of the problems that must be addressed now. This is significant not 
just for protecting African Americans as a discrete group, but also in attempting to minimize harms for 
everyone as genetic research expands in the future. 
 Many commentators have criticized efforts to develop ethical frameworks, rules, and legislation 
that deal specifically with DNA and genetic information as ―genetic exceptionalism.‖156 In this view, 
genetic information is parallel to information that we already have about family history and ancestry, so it 
poses no additional threats to privacy or discrimination based on stigmatizing characteristics. One 
problem with such arguments is that genetic information is different. While it contains probabilistic 
information and not certainties, the result suggests more than what manifested conditions would reveal. 
For example, even if there are only a few manifested cases of breast cancer in a person‘s family history, 
that person may still have a significantly above-average risk of developing breast cancer in their own 
lives, depending on the toxins to which they may be exposed, or just because of chance alone. Or, while 
a person may not express symptoms of stigmatizing conditions as alcoholism157 or schizophrenia,158they 
may possess genes linked to all these issues. Genetics may also be used to infer behavioral propensities 
even when tied to less significant conditions, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).159 
 Thus, the anti-―exceptionalism‖ view does not address real problems associated with genetic 
information where current solutions are inadequate or do not explicitly cover genetic information. The 
alternative is to just rely on existing legal protections for health information. But these may not be robust 
enough, given how comprehensive genetic information can be—including as it does all of ancestry, 
disease risk, and potentially even behavioral propensities combined. For example, Fourth Amendment 
protections on the acquisition of genetic information obtained from medical research by law 
enforcement agencies may not apply if a subpoena is used to obtain the information, if it is voluntarily 
submitted upon request (e.g., as a condition of a consent form) or acquired from a public data source.160 
 Thoughtfully developing detailed policy responses to the problems that we see emerge from this 
discussion is outside the scope of this Note, but I will briefly outline the key issues. First, the use of 
kinship searching by law enforcement leads to increased racial disparities in the criminal justice system, 
while also challenging one of the core principles governing the use of DNA in forensics: that only those 
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who are criminals or suspected with probable cause of criminal activity should be targeted by this 
scheme. This principle needs to have a statutory basis, since constitutional challenges against the racial 
disparities presented by the use of forensic DNA databases are likely to fail, as courts have been 
unfriendly towards similar challenges to criminal sentencing disparities.161 This principle animates the 
legislature‘s refusal to extend DNA typing to the population as a whole and in many cases mandate 
expungement of samples from those who are cleared of charges. 
 Whether this principle should be changed is a question that should be decided at the political 
level, rather than through the discretion of law enforcement agencies or government officials with 
authority over law enforcement.162 This is especially necessary given the high level of mistrust that 
minority communities have towards law enforcement, which as outlined above is a likely contributor to 
their reluctance to embrace genetic technologies that can be used for criminal investigations.163 An 
alternative proposal that has been raised is that racial disparities can be best addressed without losing the 
benefits of DNA searches for crime by expanding the database to include all Americans, without regard 
to status within the criminal justice system.164 If such an approach were to gain political support in the 
future, it may still not serve to alleviate concerns among minority communities that criminal 
investigations are not uniformly targeted. But at least they could potentially have the positive benefit of 
not exposing minority populations to disproportionate effects due to the capture of family members in 
database searches, with the accompanying problematic ethical issues. However, such benefits would 
potentially come with costs. The effective conduct of investigations may be inhibited due to the potential 
for spurious hits to a rise in property crimes, the added risk of ―framing‖ innocent people for crimes by 
planting their DNA (which is a potential problem currently, but could become more practical with a 
greater population in the database), and the costs of creating and maintaining such a large database, 
especially given the existing backlog in DNA testing.165 
 Second, prohibitions against the use of genetic information as a basis for genetic discrimination 
should be strengthened. The application of sickle cell carrier disease screening is in one sense an ―easy 
problem,‖ since it fell under the purview of existing civil rights legislation, as exemplified by the decision 
in Norman-Bloodsaw.166 Genetic testing was explicitly conditioned on race, and medical testing overall on 
race and gender; consequently, existing laws were adequate to the protection of individuals who faced 
the misuse of their genetic information. Sickle cell anemia was a stigmatizing disease that was associated 
with racism in a clearly understandable way: in Norman-Bloodsaw and other workplaces and schools, 
African Americans were selected for testing, as the disease was considered to be restricted to them as a 
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definable racial group. Irrespective of whether an individual tested positive for sickle cell, the testing was 
itself an instance of racial discrimination. 
 However, future applications of screening will present subtle ways in which genetic information 
will be used to discriminate against groups. Stigma may no longer attach to easily identifiable categories 
like race, gender, national origin, or even disability (where genetic differences have not yet manifested in 
physical or mental impairment), and existing laws that are narrowly protective of these kinds of groups 
will be ineffective for the next generation of social categorization. GINA is a first step toward 
eliminating the threat of discrimination, but it must be strengthened. This can be done by adding a 
private right of action and enhancing damage provisions to prevent misuse of genetic information. 
Further, GINA should be expanded beyond a narrow construction of genetic information to include 
other kinds of differences in molecular biology, which are being discovered at an increasingly rapid 
pace.167 
 Third, the application of genetic research to racial reification must be barred to prevent the kind 
of statistical discrimination that we might start seeing otherwise (the above point). To this end, we 
should prevent the use of ―race‖ as one of the categories in which medical research is reported for 
genetic studies.168 One approach that has been suggested by a leading medical journal is to replace 
ancestry, ethnicity, and racial information with the genetic markers that represent the categories of 
different individuals who are identified in a genetic study. The commonality may or may not be 
correlated with a ―racial‖ category, but it would not be labeled with words that would identify it as 
such.169 Alternatively, tables in articles may explicitly be headed with words that explicitly indicate that 
race or ethnicity is being used merely as a ―category‖ and not a biological reality, or that it is ―self-
identified‖ where the category is significant for studying health disparities.170 
 However, it is important to note the limits of this approach, since ancestry information may be 
easily obtained from GWAS databases by identifying the kinds of markers that have been used for 
ancestry identification to the DNA sequence data that is stored in databases, using the same kind of 
techniques described above for the re-identification of personal data. Also, if particular DNA sequence 
features are in fact associated with particular ethnic heritage because of shared ancestry, then studying 
their significance to disease risk will be difficult unless enough individuals with that ancestry are recruited 
into the study, which requires identification of study participants as part of the research process.171 
Moreover, simply removing racial categories in their totality from all medical research risks concealing 
                                                 
167 See Roberts, supra note 68 (describing gaps in GINA in particular due to an overemphasis on the 
antisubordination concept of genetic discrimination); Mark A. Rothstein, Yu Cai & Gary E. Marchant, Ethical Implications 
of Epigenetics Research, 10 NAT‘L REV. GENETICS 224 (2009) (describing legal and ethical challenges posed by epigenetic 
information, which consists of molecular changes to DNA that are not associated with changes in the A-C-T-G base 
sequence that would be protected by GINA). 
168 See Roberts, supra note 98. 
169 Editorial, Genes, Drug and Race, 29 NATURE GENETICS 239, 239–40 (2001). 
170 Judith B. Kaplan & Trude Bennett, Use of Race and Ethnicity in Biomedical Publication, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS‘N. 
2709, 2714 (2007). 
171 See Esteban González Burchard et al., The Importance of Race and Ethnic Background in Biomedical Research and 
Clinical Practice, 348 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1170 (2003); Carlos D. Bustamante et al., Genomics for the World, 475 NATURE 163, 
164 (2011). 




legitimate racial disparities in medical care, disease risk, and health outcomes that arise from 
socioeconomic disparities.172 
 Overall, the goal should be to direct the scientific community to develop research norms that 
critique the use of genetic correlations that involve race and ethnicity. Achieving this will involve specific 
legislative and regulatory changes that are targeted toward policies promulgated by the groups that in 
practice govern the kind of information that is produced as a result of biomedical research: public 
funding agencies, predominately the National Institutes of Health, which support and guide the work 
done by academic investigators, regulators of medical research institutions where most privately-funded 
research takes place, such as by a reformation of HIPAA rules and the Food and Drug Administration, 
which regulates the use of genetic information by the pharmaceutical and diagnostic industries when they 
use it to develop products. 
 Ultimately, though, the most powerful policy measures will be those that actually target the 
outcome of the misappropriation and misuse of genetic information, beyond just taking a privacy-based 
or anti-discrimination framework, which fails to account for what genetic information actually means. It 
is true that genetic information does not necessarily indicate that any disease or other characteristic will 
actually manifest and appear in reality. The DNA sequence is at most a probabilistic blueprint for 
potential interaction with the environment. Seen this way, the core principle of genetic policy ought to 
ensure that genetic information will not be used as a basis for discrimination or stigmatization, a concept 
that Harris and Sulston have called ―genetic equity.‖173 
 GINA is based on the anticlassification principle, with its analogue the ―colorblindness‖ 
paradigm for racial discrimination, in which it is the categorization based on genetic information that is 
the harm that the statute seeks to avoid—explicitly so in its provisions keeping the employer as ―blind‖ 
to the employee‘s genetic information as possible. 174 This would seem to deal with the stigmatization 
problem, but it ignores the fact that genetic information does indicate the potential for something real to 
manifest, such as the potential risk for physical disability upon environmental exposure. For example, 
what if an employee‘s genetic information indicated that they were at greater risk of carpal tunnel 
syndrome unless there were accommodations made in their job?175 Because GINA forces employers to 
be deliberately ―blind‖ to the information about risk, and there is no physically manifested disability that 
triggers the reasonable accommodation requirement in the American Disabilities Act (―ADA‖), then the 
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employee will fall through the cracks.176 Thus, while GINA may represent an important first step, it is 
important to ensure that antidiscrimination in the genetic information context does not follow the 
anticlassification paradigm that fails to recognize the existence of any harm associated with 
discrimination other than the mere social and emotional stigma of categorization. 
 The example of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(―UNCRPD‖) may be instructive. The UNCRPD considers the importance of social rights, such as the 
rights to health care, income assistance, education, and other critical social services needed by a person 
with a disability given their particular circumstances.177 Similarly, genetic information manifests itself as 
an anticipated need for additional social services based on genetic risk, such as medical care. Consequently, 
there ought to be an analogous consideration of social rights in addition to basic civil rights. At the 
present time, while they are a part of the European Union‘s Charter of Fundamental Rights, social rights 
seem to be outside the realm of American constitutional law, at least as it is currently being interpreted 
by the Supreme Court and understood by legislators and the public. 178 
 However, it is likely that much of the American attitude towards social rights is based on the 
ideal of individualism, which eschews collective responsibility for what is believed to be under individual 
control, or for problems that only affect ―other people.‖ The reality of genetic information is that everyone 
has DNA sequences that suggest the potential for acquiring a disease and manifesting a disability. That 
means that our genomes teach us that we are all at risk of being left out of the social mainstream, 
regardless of our racial, ethnic, gender, or economic classification at the present time. Even if exactly 
how far we are left out of the mainstream will depend on where we start from, we all risk something in 
the absence of a collective safety net and a society that does not concern itself with the accommodation 
of physical and psychological variations from what is assumed to be ―normal.‖ It is possible that one 
consequence of widespread DNA sequencing will be the recognition of a need for a social charter as a 
measure that protects everyone, regardless of one‘s own perceived present social status. This goal will 
certainly not be reached if genetic information is used to reinforce the divisions that exist within society 
by validating regressive attitudes about the biological reality of racial and ethnic difference.  
CONCLUSION 
 Applying the science of genomics will be like no other technological advancement. There is not 
just one single human genome to discover. What we call the ―genome‖ is the collective of all our 
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personal DNA sequences, each of which contains unique information that is particular to each of us as 
individuals. Thus, there is a dilemma between the universal and the individual, in which individual 
interests must be protected if information is disclosed to achieve universal benefits in medical research. 
It will be insufficient to merely attempt to ensure genetic privacy, especially through the current 
protections based on de-identification and anonymization of personal data in genome-wide association 
studies. 
 As detailed in this note, genetic information is not like other kinds of medical or other personally 
identifiable information. Genetic information is hard to destroy, especially once it has been translated to 
computer code. Once anonymized, it easily may be re-identified. Most important of all, while its import 
in determining intelligence or behavior is controversial, there is no doubt that an individual‘s DNA 
sequence contains a large amount of sensitive medical information. Most critically, compromises to 
genetic privacy affect family members as much as they do the individual who has either consented to the 
release of their genetic information or participated in a study that releases genetic information. As the 
Fourth Amendment experience with forensic DNA testing demonstrates, trying to fit genetic 
information into our existing legal system for privacy protection runs into practical problems. 
Consequently, the development of new policies that target genetic information differently will not be 
mere ―genetic exceptionalism,‖ but rather, necessary responses to real problems that already affect 
people. 
 These issues have all been discussed from the perspective of African Americans and other racial 
and ethnic minorities within the United States because the problem currently exists in that part of the 
population. Because genetic discrimination compounds existing racial discrimination and social 
disadvantage, it is important to take the current disparate impact of genetic discrimination on African 
Americans into account in establishing strong protections over misuse of genetic information gained 
through studies to encourage their confidence in medical research and ensure that they do not continue 
to be underrepresented as the next generation of medicine emerges. More broadly, we can also consider 
the African American experience with sickle cell disease carrier screening and forensic DNA databases as 
a kind of ―canary in the coal mine‖ which anticipates the potential risks for the population as a whole as 
genetic studies become more pervasive. From this perspective, developing robust measures to present 
misuse of personal genetic information should be a critical goal for everyone, irrespective of race.  
 
